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Introduction
The Arab Spring was a regional social mobilization that unrevealed ruling-bargains in the
Middle East, which have been resilient since the early 1950s. In Tunisia, Ben Ali was ousted in
about three weeks and fled to Saudi Arabia. After two weeks of demonstrations in Egypt,
Mubarak resign from the presidency because the police failed to quell the uprising and the
military refused to come to his aid. Following his resignation, he was arrested by the military and
is currently awaiting trial for killing demonstrators, embezzlement of state funds, etc. In Libya,
Qaddafi was ousted in an eight month civil war with NATO intervention that resulted in his
demise. Despite the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, some ruling-bargains
have survived, such as in Syria.
In the beginning of the Syrian uprising, it appeared Assad’s ruling bargain was
unraveling and it was only a matter of time before he met a similar fate like Ben Ali, Mubarak
and Qaddafi. However, overtime the conflict morphed into a sectarian struggle that divided the
country among sectarian and socioeconomic lines. The sectarian nature of the conflict has
prevented the regime from falling. As a result, my research question is how does identity politics
explain the resilience of Assad’s ruling bargain? This question is important because it will
explain the survival of authoritarianism and how identity politics can hinder the perquisite for
democratization, the need for national unity. It will also help U.S. policymakers by showing
them the concerns of minorities if the regime falls. Minorities are convinced there is no future for
them in a post-Assad Syria, so they support the regime largely out of fear of the alternative.
Guaranteeing these communities they have a future will bring down Assad and may bring fourth
democratization.
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This paper will first explain what authoritarianism is and explore factors that contribute
to the survival of authoritarianism, such as repression, legitimacy, external factors and
cooptation. Finally, an analysis will be provided to explain how Assad has manipulated Syria’s
heterogeneous nature to ensure his survival by demonstrating how Alawites, Christians, Druze,
the Sunni bourgeoisie and the State bourgeoisie have benefited from the ruling bargain. Along
with how they have helped propped up Assad, such as forming paramilitary groups and how the
ruling elite have remain loyal in a time of crisis. Since the uprising began, defections have
rampant the ruling bargain. However, defections primarily occur in the lower positions of power,
which are predominantly Sunni while Alawites control the upper echelons of power. These
defections have gradually created a storage of man power to confront the opposition and defend
strategic positons.
However, the formation of paramilitaries under the National Defense Forces (NDF) have
solved this problem. Also, the growing sectarian nature of the civil war has made minorities
more dependent on the regime for protection because of the fear of being targeted by
fundamentalist elements of the opposition like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and
Jabhat Al-Nusra. Finally, Assad has retain support from critical institutions in society like the
military. This due to the fact that critical positions are filled with close relatives to Assad. From
the role of minorities in the conflict and having a family based regime, my thesis is the
cooptation of minorities and relatives into the ruling bargain has enabled Assad’s regime to
survive.
Explaining the Survival of Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is a system to govern society where order and control is favored over
liberty. In authoritarianism, society is either ruled by a single individual with absolute power, or
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a ruling coalition where power is distributed within the coalition. In most cases the ruling
coalition usually makes up about one percent of society. The coalition consists of different
aspects of society, such as institutions that support the regime for privileges like power, wealth
and security in exchange for support. An example is when Gretchen Casper states in Fragile
Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, “Under authoritarianism, the church or
military are pulled into an active political stance in support of the regime (in the case of the
military), or opposition to it (as with the church).”1 The church and military are examples of
institutions that can be part of the coalition.
Under authoritarian rule, the one percent monopolizes power and the majority is largely
excluded from different aspects of society like the political and economic realms. An example of
an authoritarian regime is in Syria where the Assad family has ruled the country for the past
forty-five years. Assad has monopolized power by putting loyal family members and friends in
the upper echelons of society regardless of their qualifications. As a result, this has excluded the
majority of Syrians from having a role in governing the country. The purpose of this is to ensure
the survival of the regime and maintain the status quo.
However, one of the main drawbacks of authoritarianism is that it’s an unstable form of
government in the long-run. According to Gretchen Casper, “instability could generate from the
erosion of the regime’s legitimacy, defections of key members of the regime’s support coalition,
conflict within the ruling block itself, or the emergence of a credible alternative leader.”2
Within the forty-five years that the Assad family has ruled Syria, the regime experienced three
events that have shaken the regime to its core. From 1979 to 1982, there was an Islamist
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insurgency that almost pushed the country to the brink of civil war. In 1983, there was an
attempted coup by Hafiz Al-Assad’s brother Rif’at when Assad was incapacitated due to an
illness. Finally, there is the current civil war that has tested the regime to its limits. Despite the
challenges autocrats encounter, many of them have been able to survive for long periods of time
like Assad. As a result, scholars have develop four theories to explain the resilience of
authoritarianism. These theories consist of repression, legitimacy, external factors and
cooptation.
Repression
The first school of thought consists of repression. Repression is the state’s use of
coercion to restrict the ability of the majority from participating in the political realm of society.
In Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy, Abel Escriba-Folch
acknowledges Davenport’s claim that, “state coercion has two basic components: violent
repression that violates personal integrity and less violent (or nonviolent) activities that restrict
civil liberties.”3 Both violent and nonviolent methods of coercion are utilize by autocrats to
maintain order.
Scholars like Abel Escriba-Folch, Sergei Guriev, Daniel Treisman, and Ronald A.
Francisco analyze whether repression is an effective strategy to increase the chances of survival
for an authoritarian system. Abel Escriba-Folch proclaims, “The results reveal that repression
certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival.”4 His analysis of the relationship
between survival and repression demonstrates that repression is effective in increasing the
chances of survival. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman in How Modern Dictators Survive:

Abel Escriba-Folch, “Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy,” International Political Science
Review 34 5 (2013): 546
4
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Review 34 5 (2013): 543
3
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Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression also assert that repression is an effective
strategy. However, they declare “repression is used against citizens only as a last resort when the
opportunities to survive through co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are exhausted.5 From
their research repression acts as a useful means when all other methods have been exhausted to
quell unrest.
The main dilemma with the use of repression is it can generate resentment towards the
state and backfire. For example, Ronald A. Francisco proclaims in Repression and Mobilization,
“Lichbach’s theorems demonstrate that consistent repression necessarily increases the amount of
revolutionary zeal in a country.”6 In the case of Syria, repression did work when Hafiz Al-Assad
crushed the Islamist insurgency in Hama of 1982. Yet, when Bashar followed his father’s
strategy, repression backfired by increasing the revolutionary of zeal among Syrians, sparked
international outrage and ignited an armed insurgency.
Legitimacy
The second school of thought is legitimacy. Legitimacy involves the notion whether the
public accepts the ruling regime. Paul Brooker proclaims in Non-Democratic Regimes, “One
critical aspect for the consolidation of authoritarian rule involves seeking legitimacy.”7 In
democratic societies, the majority of the public does not question the legitimacy of their leaders
because they gain their right to lead through fair elections, where the public votes for their rulers.
In the case of autocrats, they have to prove why the public should accept them. They often rely
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on nationalist sentiment to where Paul Brooker proclaims, “The majority of authoritarian rulers
justify their rule by playing on national interests or patriotic claims.”8
However, some autocrats have survived with little legitimacy. Instead they generate fear
in society by brutally crushing dissent and rely on their foreign alliances for support. Prior to the
Syrian uprising, Assad justified his rule by claiming he is the only Arab leader willing to
confront Israel. Despite his stance towards Israel, this did not prevent the majority of Syrians
from rebelling against him. Assad lost legitimacy domestically, regionally and international due
to his use of force to quell the demonstrations. The loss of legitimacy has weaken the regime but,
it has been able to survive by crushing dissent, exploiting sectarianism and relying on Russia,
China, Iran and Hezbollah for support.
External Factors
External factors is the third school of thought. External factors includes the role of
outsiders in a state’s affairs. Scholars like Nicole J. Jackson, Peter Burnell and Oliver
Schlumberger argue the role of external factors is essential to the survival of authoritarianism.
According to Nicole J. Jackson in International Politics and National Political Regimes:
Promoting Democracy-Promoting Autocracy, “external factors influence authoritarian states to
maintain the status quo and further entrench authoritarian rule.” 9 Today, two states play a
pivotal role in supporting authoritarian leaders, and they are Russia and China. Peter Burnell and
Oliver Schlumberger states in Promoting- Democracy -Promoting Autocracy? International
Politics and the National Political Regimes, “the largest players are Russian and China both at
the forefront of today’s intense intellectual interest in authoritarian renewal and what it means for
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international politics.”10 Foreign powers bolster authoritarian leaders by providing political,
economic and military assistance.
An example is the Russian and Syrian relationship where Roy Allison states in Russia
and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis, “Russia has provided a diplomatic
shield for Syrian state and bolstered it with arms supplies.”11 Assad also receives support from
Iran and Hezbollah in terms of economic and military. An example is when Milani Mohsen
states in Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism), “In July 2013, the two nations signed an
agreement in which the Iranian Central Bank pledged to provide its Syrian counterpart with a
$3.6 billion line of credit to purchase Iranian oil in exchange for allowing Iran to invest the
equivalent amount in Syria.”12 This credit has enabled Assad to maintain the war effort by
purchasing more arms.
Despite Assad’s foreign support, some regimes have survived with limited outside
support. An example is North Korea where the Kim Jong Dynasty has ruled for the past seventy
years. The regime follows a strict isolation policy where it has minimum contact with the
outside. The country does have relations with other states like China, but overall North Korea
has few close allies. The regime relies on repression, propaganda and cooptation to survive. The
dependency on these methods have gradually turn North Korea into a totalitarian state over time,
which is an extreme form of authoritarianism.

Peter Burnell and Oliver Schlumberger, “Promoting- Democracy -Promoting Autocracy? International Politics
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Cooptation
The final school of thought consists of cooptation. Cooptation is a tactic deployed by
autocrats to incorporate components of society into the ruling bargain by providing privileges in
exchange for support. Scholars like Beatriz Magaloni, Milan W. Svolik, Jennifer Gandhi and
Adam Przeworski, assert cooptation is critical for survival. According to Jennifer Gandhi and
Adam Przeworski in Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats, “autocrats face two
types of threats to their rule: those that emerge from within the ruling elite and those that come
from outsiders within society.”13 The most common threat usually emerges within the regime
itself.
To eliminate threats the regime co-opts forces in society that pose a threat, such as state
institutions, members of civil society, etc. Beatriz Magaloni demonstrates in Credible PowerSharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule Power how dictators eliminate threats when he
states, “dictators can minimize the risks of being overthrown when they are able to co-opt
potential rivals by offering credible power-sharing deals that guarantee a share of power over the
long run.”14 Power is shared among different aspects of society to where a ruling coalition is
formed that entrenches the authoritarian structure.
However, a persistent threat to the ruling coalition is factionalism. Members of the ruling
elite may try to increase their power at the expense of others. An illustration is when Milan W.
Svolik states in Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes, “When the
members of the ruling coalition suspect that the dictator is making steps towards strengthening

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative
Politics Studies 40 11 (2007): 1280.
14
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his position at their expense, they may stage a coup in order to stop him.”15 An example is the
Hafiz Al-Assad and Salah Jadid rivalry before Assad’s Corrective Movement of 1970. Both
Assad and Jadid were from the Alawite community and were powerful figures in the Syrian
Ba’thist ruling coalition. Gradually, tension brew between them, especially after the Arab’s
defeat in the Six-Day War. According to Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria:
Politics and Society under Assad and the Ba’th Party, “The conflict took a more serious
proportions after the Arab military defeat in June 1967, partly due to differences of opinion over
military, foreign and socioeconomic policies which were then to be pursued.”16
The rivalry split the ruling coalition between an Assad faction and Jadid faction. In the
end, Assad out maneuvered Jadid and ousted him in a coup called the Corrective Movement.
After Assad came to power, he brought an end to Syria’s instability by purging Jadid supporters,
interweaving minorities, family, and friends into the ruling bargain. Loyalists of Assad received
security, power, and wealth in exchange for support. The cooptation of these groups has enabled
the regime to survive because their interests are interwoven within the regime. If Assad falls,
they risk losing everything they gained and becoming marginalized.
The Probable Explanation
Repression, Legitimacy, External Factors and Cooptation are strategies utilize by
authoritarian regimes to ensure their survival. From these four strategies cooptation presents the
most compelling to explain the survival of autocrats. Repression is useful to eliminate threats to
the status quo, but it can backfire by increasing the revolutionary zeal of the opposition. Assad’s
use of repression to crush the peaceful demonstrations increased the revolutionary zeal of the

Milan W. Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of
Political Science 53 2 (2009): 481.
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opposition, drew international criticism and ignited an armed insurgency. Legitimacy is
improbable because some regimes have survived with little legitimacy. Instead they rely on
repression, manipulation and foreign support for survival, such as in Syria today. Assad has
survived by eliminating dissent, exploiting sectarianism and relying on his foreign allies.
External factors is impractical because regimes have survived with little foreign support
like North Korea. In Syria, support from Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah have helped Assad
by providing political, military and economic support. However, a critical component to Assad’s
survival is his strategy to demonize the opposition as terrorists and release fundamentalists with
links to Al-Qaeda from prison. This strategy has rallied minorities around the regime and prevent
humanitarian intervention because minorities and the international community fear the
alternative if Assad falls. Cooptation presents the best explanation because when elements of
society are integrated into the system, they benefit from the privileges granted to them in
exchange for support.
Factionalism is a persistent threat to the ruling coalition. However, everyone must think
twice before turning against the status quo because they could lose what they gain and plunge
society into anarchy. Assad has survived by integrating Alawites, Christians, the Sunni
Bourgeoisie and State Bourgeoisie into the ruling bargain. These groups have benefited from the
regime in terms of security, power and wealth. They are reluctant to abandon Assad because they
fear losing what they gained and becoming marginalized in a post-Assad Syria.
Alawites
Syria is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the Middle East. According to
Raymond Hinnebusch and David W. Lesch in The Government and Politics of the Middle East
and North Africa, “Sunnis constitute 74 percent of the population, with Alawites at 12 percent,
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Christians at 10 percent,Druzes at 3 percent and Jews other Muslim sects like Ismailis at 1
percent.”17 For the past forty-five years, Syria has been ruled by an offshoot of Shia Islam
minority called the Alawites. Prior to the Ba’thist coup of 1963 and Hafiz Al-Assad’s Corrective
Movement in 1970, the Alawites were marginalized in society. They were discriminated and
subordinate to Sunni domination. This treatment is demonstrated when Jomana Qaddour states in
Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria, “Before Assad came into power, the portion of the
Alawites society not enlisted in the military were often hired as servants to Sunnis.”18
However, when the Ba’thists took over in 1963, life changed for the community.
According to Nikolaos Van Dam, “Alawites were awarded scholarships and traveled abroad for
higher degrees, becoming doctors, engineers, lawyers and university professors so that in the
1990s they were strongly represented in the professions and senior cadres of the state, rivalling
and sometimes displacing the Sunni and Christian intelligentsia.”19 When Hafiz Al-Assad came
to power, the community continued to prosper. Hafiz created a power base among his fellow
Alawites and relatives by putting them in high government positions like the bureaucracy.
Assad’s favoritism towards Alawites is demonstrated when Joshua Landis proclaims in The
Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is likely to Survive to 2013, “a Syrian
ambassador who fled to Turkey told Hurriyet, “There are 360 diplomats within the Syrian
Foreign Ministry with 60 percent Alawites and less than 10 percent Sunni.”20 The percentage
difference between Alawites and Sunnis demonstrates that the ruling bargain is sectarian.

Raymond Hinnebusch and David W. Lesch. “Syrian Arab Republic.” In The Government and Politics of the
Middle East and North Africa, edited by Mark Gasiorowski, 262. Boulder: Westview Press, 2014.
18
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19
Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba’th Party (New
York: I.B. Tarius & Co Ltd, 2011), 9.
20
Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013”, Middle East
Policy 19 1 (2012): 73.
17
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When the 2011 Syrian uprising began, it appeared the fall of Assad’s ruling bargain was
imminent. Bashar used repression like his father in Hama in 1982 to crush the uprising, but this
time repression failed. Instead it backfired against the regime by exacerbating the situation. It
increased the revolutionary zeal of the opposition, and severely undermine Assad’s legitimacy to
where he lost significant amounts of support from the Sunni periphery. The use of force also
sparked international outrage. The Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, the country was
hit with sanctions, world leaders called for Assad to step down and the regime was plagued with
defections.
Despite these setbacks, Assad has been able to survive by exploiting sectarianism. The
regime demonizes the opposition as fundamentalists which makes minorities reluctant from
defecting out of fear of an uncertain future. This strategy also makes the international community
reluctant to overthrow Assad because fundamentalist groups like Al-Nusra and the ISIS have
become the strongest elements of the opposition. The fear of Syria falling into the hands of
fundamentalists has made the international community wary of intervening despite their
disproval of Assad. This strategy has also indoctrinated Alawites in believing they are nothing
without the regime. Assad’s indoctrination has generated concerns within the community. They
fear retribution because some elements of the opposition perceive them as apostates, they
consider the community guilty base on association, and messages have emerge within the
opposition threating Alawites. Jomana Qaddour captures the growing hostility towards Alawites
when she states, “Images and videos emerging out of Syria since 2012, becoming increasingly
violent and sectarian along the way, showcased extremist groups and even children chanting
things like, “Assad we will bring you down, and then we will come next for the [Alawites]!”21
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The community also worries of becoming marginalize and subordinate to Sunni
domination again. The fears of retribution and marginalization stems from observing the
sectarianism that has unfolded in Iraq after the fall of Saddam in 2003. Sunnis are targeted and
have become marginalized by the Shia government because they have been deemed guilty base
on association. The indoctrination of the Alawite community enables the regime to prevent
defections and sympathizing with the opposition by spreading fear within the community. This
has caused the community to remain loyal to the regime and report those who try to flee or
sympathize with the opposition. In one incident Jomana Qaddour proclaims, “A deserter who
called his cousin, seeking help to escape Syria, was found dead the next morning, presumably
because his own cousin had reported him.”22 Assad’s exploitation of sectarianism has not only
pin communities against each other, but have turn family members against each other within
communities.
Christians
Similar to Alawites, Christians have prospered under Assad. Christians have rose to
prominent positions within the system and according to Reese Erlich in Inside Syria: The
Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, “many Syrian Christians achieved
higher incomes and educational levels than their Muslim counterparts, differences that persist
today.”23 Also, the ruling bargain drawn in Christian’s base on portraying the regime as secular.
When Hafiz-Al Assad was in power, he emphasized the need to do away with sectarianism and
embrace Syrian Ba’thist identity. Nikolaos Van Dam states, Assad urged the public to abandon
sectarianism:

Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria”, Washington Quarterly 36 4 (2013): 71.
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Islam is one thing and this gang is something else again. The Arab Ba’th Socialist
Party is a nationalist party that does not differentiate between religions. As a
faithful Muslim, I encourage everyone to have faith and fight rigidity and
fanaticism, because they contradict Islam. I believe that a true Muslim is the
brother of his Muslim and Christian brothers, and that a true Christian is the
brother of the Christian and Muslim. If Syria had not always been above
sectarianism, it would not now exist.”24
The regime’s secularism provided a blanket of security for Christians. However, when the
uprising broke out the blanket of security corroded. In the beginning, hostilities were directed
towards the regime and the Alawite community. As the conflict progress, extremists groups took
root in the country and hostilities towards Christians started to emerge. According Mary Mikhael
in The Syrian War and the Christians of the Middle East, “slogans such as "Syria is the land of
the Prophet!" or "Syria is the land of jihad" filled the air and these were directed towards
Christians and other minorities.”25 These slogans have generated concerns within the
community.
Now Christians no longer feel safe in their homeland. Violence has been inflicted upon
them. An example when Reese Enrlich tells the story of Maryam in the city Qusayr, “where
masked man entered their apartment one night with the intent to kidnap all the Christian men in
Qusayr.”26 Moreover, Christian areas controlled by salafi fundamentalist groups like ISIS have
been told to either convert or die. Due to the collapse of security within the country, many
Christians have fled the country or moved to areas where the government still has firm control.
The fear of Salafi fundamentalism has propelled Christians to rally around Assad, such as in
Saidnaya. Frederik Pleitgen reports in Pro-Government Forces Find a Haven at Syria Town’s
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Christian Monastery, “Syrian Christian fighters have aided the Syrian Army in propelling the
Jabhat el-Nusra’s advance towards Saidnaya.”27
Druzes
Compared to Alawites and Christians where the majority support Assad, it is difficult to
pinpoint the Druze’s political affiliation because Firas Maksad states in The Druze Dilemma for
Foreign Affairs, “determining the loyalties of Syria’s Druze has been difficult, as its members
hide their political persuasions -- a preference for privacy with roots in their theological concept
of taqiyya, the concealing of one’s religious beliefs to avoid accusations of heresy.”28 In the
beginning of the conflict, the Druzes tried to maintained a neutral stance, but as Sarita Saad
states in Lebanon Druze wary of being dragged into Syria conflict, “the killing of some of the
sect’s religious leaders have dragged the community into the conflict.”29
Since becoming involved in the conflict, the community has been divided between
supporting Assad or not. Similar to Christians, some Druzes support the regime because of its
secularist nature. An example is when a Druze name Akba Abu Shaheen tells Reese Erlich, “It’s
important for me not to live in a religious country, but in a secular country.”30 Like other
minorities the Druzes are fearful of being targeted by fundamentalists because they are perceived
as heretics. As a result, some Druze have taken arms to defend their territory and form militias
like the Jaysh Al-Muwahhideen, which mainly operates out of the Suwayda Province because it
has the highest Druze population in the country.
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However, some Druzes have developed grievances towards Assad. According to Firas
Maksad, “Their biggest grievance is that Assad has not provided them with enough weapons to
defend against attacks by ISIS and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusra.”31 The
community has threaten to turn its back against the regime, acquire arms from other sources, and
act independently if Assad is not willing to help. The loss of the Druzes could be critical blow to
the regime because Firas Maksad proclaims, “For Assad, the Druze are a strategic buffer,
defending the southern flank of Damascus from rebel-controlled territory farther south.”32 The
loss of the Druzes could open a path to allow the opposition to march into Damascus.
Paramilitaries
The concerns express by religious minorities provides Assad a support base and help
bolster the regime’s military capabilities by forming paramilitary groups. These groups have
been essential because the continuation of the war has taken its toll on the Syrian Army.
According to the Carter Center in Syria: Pro-Government Paramilitary Forces, “Defections,
desertions, battle losses, the challenges of urban warfare, and the war of attrition waged by the
opposition significantly depleted the number of men available to fight.”33 The formation of
paramilitary groups have help the regime to solve problems involving the Syrian Army, such as
defections and the military’s inexperience to fight an asymmetric war. The Carter Center
proclaims:

This new formation meets a number of the government’s needs. First, men who
joined the NDF did so voluntarily and, as such, the risk of defection is low.
Second, the NDF gives a much needed numerical boost to government forces
throughout the country. Third, NDF fighters, as irregular or paramilitary elements,
Firas Maksad, “The Druze Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2014, accessed May 31, 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2014-10-08/druze-dilemma
32
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31
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are receiving training in asymmetrical, urban, and guerrilla warfare - a style of
war that the Syrian army was not prepared for, and which happens to be the
dominant fighting mode of the opposition. Not all NDF members have completed
their mandatory military service (conscription), so the government is allowing
members to meet their conscription term in the NDF. Military officers attached to
NDF units are in charge of coordinating with the regular army, planning
operations, and calling in artillery and air support.34

These paramilitary groups have been used to defend territories under government control while
the Syrian Army goes on the offensive. They have also aided government forces in offensive
operations, such as in Aleppo because according to the Carter Center, “These militias, unlike
regular troops that come from different parts of the country, enjoy extensive knowledge of the
local neighborhoods-turned-battlefields.35 As a result, paramilitaries have been vital to help
maintain the war effort.
Sunni Bourgeoisie
Despite losing the majority of Sunni periphery, Assad still retains support from the Sunni
bourgeoisie or urban Sunnis. They have been reluctant to join the opposition because they have
benefited from Assad’s economic liberalization policies during the early 2000s. When Bashar
Al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, he inherited a failing economy. Reese Erlich proclaims,
“Syria was the second poorest country in the Middle East following Yemen before Assad’s
economic reforms.”36 The poor performance of the economy could have ignited social unrest that
could have threaten the ruling bargain. However, Assad launched economic reforms, which
according to Reese Erlich included, “the privatization of some state-run industries and lowered
tariffs on imported goods, following an economic model promoted by the International Monetary
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Fund and the World Bank.”37 The Sunni bourgeoisie were able to purchase state own businesses
or create their own business like insurance or telecommunication companies. Assad’s economic
liberalization bought loyalty from them.
The civil war has brought further strains on an already fragile economy. Reese Erlich
addresses:

International sanctions against Syria, the loss of most exports, and the destruction
of war sent the economy into a tailspin. Syria produced 425,000 barrels per day of
crude oil in 2011, but that dropped to zero by the end of 2013 as rebels seized
control of the oil fields. The Syrian gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.2
percent in 2010 but dropped to -21.8 percent in 2012 and -22.5 percent in 2013.”38
Despite the growing economic crisis many urban Sunnis still support the regime because they
fear losing everything they gained during Assad’s economic reforms. They also fear the country
side because some affiliate themselves with more extremist factions of the opposition. Some
support from the Sunni periphery has prevented the opposition from achieving victory because
Sunnis in urban areas like Aleppo have formed pro-regime militias as well like the Al-Quds
Brigades and the Ba’th Brigades, which Edward Dark states in Pro-regime Sunni Fighters in
Aleppo Defy Sectarian Narrative, “are almost entirely Sunni”39 These militias have lifted some
burden from the Syrian Army by guarding checkpoints in Damascus or fighting on the front lines
in critical cities like Aleppo.
State Bourgeoisie
The sectarian nature of the ruling bargain has prevented defections in what Bassam
Haddad calls the “State bourgeoisie” in Syria’s State Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the
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Regime.40 This group is Assad’s inner circle who control institutions like the Military,
Mukhabarat (secret police), Ba’th Party, Businesses, etc. The regime has suffered from
defections, but Haddad states, “The main, and perhaps only, defections witnessed occurred at the
lower and lower-middle levels within the army, with very few signiﬁcant exceptions.”41 What
makes Assad’s inner circle and state institutions remain loyal is the fact the majority of the
critical positions are filled by Assad’s relatives. Joshua Landis, states in “The Regime” for
Frontlines, “The brother in charge of security, cousins of the banking system, in laws of the
military so in reality this is a family business”42 Some examples to demonstrate members of the
Assad family are in the upper echelons of power are Bashar’s Assad’s brother Maher (Alawite)
who commands the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armor Division. Asama-Al Assad who is
Syria’s First Lady and a Sunni. Finally, Assad’s cousin Rami Maklouf (Alawite) who according
to Resse Elrich, “owns the country’s largest cell phone company and made tens of millions of
dollars base on family connections.”43
Hafiz and Bashar put close relatives in the upper echelons of society to ensure their
survival and to consolidate their power. This brought an end to the country’s turbulent past prior
to Assad’s rise to power. Coups were a persistent occurrence to the extent that some
governments collapsed within less than a year. For the past forty-five years that the Assad family
has been in power, there was only one attempted coup in late 1983. According Nikolaos Van
Dam, “The only time since the early 1970s when the regime has been really shaken from within
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its own organization was in November 1983, when Hafiz fell seriously ill and the question of his
succession appeared to become acute.”44 His brother Rif’at tried to assume control when Assad
was temporary incapacitated. However, Assad made a full recovery, assumed control, quickly
brought an end to the coup and exiled his brother for an indefinite amount of time.
Putting relatives in critical positions have also limit defections at the top when the regime
encounters a crisis, such as the civil war today. Sargon Hadaya notes in A Proxy War in Syria,
“only 47 people (27 high-ranking military and law enforcers, three Cabinet members, four
members of the parliament, and 12 diplomats)* defected between June 2011 and August 2012
and none of them belonged to the president's closest circle of decision makers.”45 One of the
critical proponents that led to Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s downfall was the independent nature of
the military from the regime. Mehran Kamrava states in Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving
Ruling Bargain in the Middle East, “when the military realized that the unfolding crisis could not
be stopped and that the continued alliance with the civilian leadership could harm its professional
and corporate interests, it deliberately distanced itself from civilian dictators making their
demise inevitable”46 In Syria, the military is integrated within the regime because Assad has
appointed relatives within critical positions of the military like Maher. States institutions are
deeply embedded in the regime to where Mehran Kamrava proclaims, “The ruling elite, and the
secret police are so intertwined that it is now impossible to separate the Assad regime from the
security establishment.”47
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In order to become part of the ruling coalition or move up the ladder loyalty became a
perquisite to where to Joshua Landis notes in The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad
Regime is likely to Survive to 2013, “Under the Assads, loyalty quickly became the ultimate
qualification for advancement into the upper ranks of the security forces.”48 Those loyal to Assad
benefited from the ruling bargain in terms of power, wealth and security in return for support.
Assad integrated every institution into the ruling bargain to consolidate his control and make it
where if any force threatens to bring down the regime, they will have to destroy the whole
structure, construct a new ruling bargain from scratch and run the risk of turning Syria into the
next Iraq or Libya.
The Absence of National Unity
Assad’s exploitation of sectarianism has prevented minorities from defecting and
sympathizing with the opposition out of fear. As a result, this has severely undermine the
prospects of democracy in Syria because the country lacks the most fundamental perquisite for a
transition towards democracy, which is national unity. Georg Sorsensen states in Democracy and
Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World, “according to Rustow, national
unity simply indicates that “the vast majority of citizens in democracy-to-be…have no doubt or
mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”49 Assad has undermine
national unity by including some groups in the ruling bargain and excluding others.
Prior to the revolution, society trusted each other regardless of one’s religious affiliation.
This is demonstrated when Reese Erlich describes a small town where a Christian university
professor name Hagop lives, “the town is twelve miles from central Damascus, the town is
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mixed between Sunni, Christian and Druze and before the crisis residents formed friendships and
business relations that extended among all religious groups.”50 Today, trust among the various
religious communities have eroded and a deep mistrust has developed in society, where everyone
is suspicious of each other. An example is when an Alawite government employee name
Ebrahim tells Reese Erlich, “If you’re invited to dinner by a Sunni, you would be afraid of an
ambush, so you would refuse.”51 Assad has used sectarianism to his advantage by driving a
wedge between the various groups. This strategy has fragmented society and disoriented the
main purpose of the revolution, which is to overthrow Assad. Now it appears removing Assad
has become a secondary objective and every group is fighting mainly to curve out a piece of
territory for themselves.
Conclusion
The Syrian civil war is now a war of attrition and recently Assad has suffered setbacks,
such as the loss of the Idlib province to Islamist elements of the opposition. This is the second
province that has fallen to the opposition following the Raqqa province in 2013. The
prolongation of the conflict and if the regime continues to experience setbacks will take its toll
on Assad’s forces by draining their moral and resources. Also, the war has drained the country’s
economy where it struggles to provide goods and services. My findings demonstrate how the
regime has relied on a coalition of support for survival and how the sectarian nature of the
conflict does not only cross religious lines, but socioeconomic as well. Alawites, Christians and
Druze support the regime because it provides them with privileges and security. These
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communities fear retribution and marginalization if the regime falls. Their concerns have rallied
the communities around the regime and help bolster its forces by forming paramilitary groups.
Despite the fact the majority of Sunnis have rebelled against Assad, he still retains
significant amounts of support from the Sunni bourgeoisie, who have benefited from the
economic reforms of the early 2000s. They too fear what will happen to them if the ruling
bargain collapses. Having Sunni support has denied the opposition a quick and absolute victory.
Some Sunnis have taken up arms to fight alongside the regime like the Ba’th Brigade. Unlike
Ben Ali, Mubarak and Qaddafi, Assad still retains support from the state bourgeoisie because
critical positions are controlled by relatives. Constructing a ruling bargain base on minorities and
relatives has decrease the likelihood of defections and coups. Those who turn against the regime
will not only lose their privileges, but their security as well. They will be targeted by Assad’s
loyalists and the opposition. However, with the war of attrition, Assad’s recent setbacks, and a
failing economy one could wonder how long will this coalition remain loyal?
My analysis will help U.S. policymakers become aware of why some groups are
unwilling to abandon the regime. These communities are convince there is no future for them in
a post-Assad Syria. Guaranteeing these groups they have a future, may bring the country together
and bring forth the first phase of the democratic process, the breakdown of the authoritarian
structure. However, Assad’s manipulation of the country’s heterogeneous nature has created
multiple hurdles to overcome. How does a society restore faith in each other when everyone is
fearful, suspicious and hold deep grievances towards each other? Unless faith is restored, the
sectarian struggle will continue to escalate and groups like ISIS will continue to wreak havoc
throughout the region. For Syria, the mostly likely scenario if the sectarian struggle continues is
the partitioning of the country among the different factions like Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
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So far Assad has been resilient to where political scientist Elie El-Hindy tells Erlich Reese,
“Assad was clever to play on the divergence in society and make people scared of each other.”52
Assad’s ability to exploit the various identities and pinning them against each other has
prevented him from meeting similar fates like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Qaddafi. Instead the regime
has been able to survive and fight another day.
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